I. Introduction
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, financial institutions began to issue bonds that, upon the occurrence of pre-specified trigger events, would either be converted into equity securities or be completely or partially written down.
1 Thanks to their allegedly improved loss-absorbing capabilities over other forms of hybrid debt, these contingent capital securities also found support from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and subsequently from regulators across the world, particularly in Europe, where contingent capital securities have been recognised as regulatory capital under current regulatory capital requirements. Such new regulations in Europe and elsewhere, coupled with stronger capital requirements in general, have in turn led to a steady increase in issuances of contingent capital securities.
The emergence of this new form of hybrid capital has coincided with, and may have facilitated, the development of incentive schemes revolving around debtbased instruments that involve write-down mechanisms. Such write-down mechanisms put the investment of the employees at risk in a fashion that would otherwise be characteristic of equity-based remuneration as the employees will stand to lose their entire claim upon occurrence of a write-down trigger. At the same time, unlike some equity-based instruments, debt-based instruments are not thought to incentivize employees to take on excessive risk as the return on their investment being independent of the profit of the firm. Furthermore, awarding debt-based remuneration to the management is an attractive proposition to shareholders as it does away with either or both the dilution of their voting power or the requirement to share dividends that usually comes with traditional equity-based incentives schemes. 2 Beginning in 2011, some banks in the UK 3 and in Switzerland 4 have thus introduced 'bonus bonds' as a means of remuneration.
However, we find that these banks have yet to pay their employees in actually issued bond securities. Instead, they have added special malus provisions to what are essentially cash-based incentive plans, whereby the terms of contingent capital securities were, to some extent, replicated on a contractual basis. Some banks have reserved the right to fulfil their obligations under their schemes by handing out contingent capital securities, but in all cases we reviewed, cash remains the default payment option. This begs the question of why contingent capital securities have not proven to be a more popular tool for the purposes of remuneration, and whether awarding contingent capital securities in kind would be preferable to cash-based awards that replicate the terms of contingent capital securities on a contractual basis.
To examine the viability of contingent capital securities as a tool for remuneration, we start out by taking a look at the literature on debt-based remuneration (II.), showing that it is highly controversial among scholars whether contingent capital securities, or other debt-based instruments for that matter, should be included in remuneration packages. Whereas global standards on remuneration are rather silent on the matter, quite the opposite is true for EU regulations. Our examination thereof (III.A) is followed by a review of UK (III.B), German (III.C) and Swiss (III.D) regulatory frameworks, in each case juxtaposed to a survey of debt-based remuneration schemes in use in each such country's financial sector. Based on the findings we gather from these jurisdictions, it appears that debt-based remuneration schemes are, in general, becoming increasingly popular with banks. We conclude that the current propensity of banks to award synthetic 'bonus bonds', i.e., deferred cash awards subject to special malus provisions, rather than contingent capital securities, is justified mainly for two reasons. First, such cash-based awards can be struc-tured so as to set incentives virtually identical to those associated with contingent capital securities whilst giving institutions a much greater deal of flexibility in structuring awards. Second, although the market in contingent capital securities is growing, liquidity in the market may be a concern because banks may need large quantities of contingent capital securities available when awards made to employees vest. Unless they can issue contingent capital securities on an as-needed basis, banks might find it hard, or at least expensive, to come by a sufficient amount of contingent capital securities in the market.
II. The Case for Using Debt-Based Instruments as Incentives

A. Overview of the Academic Debate
For decades, studies on the remuneration of (bank) executives 5 concentrated almost exclusively on equity instruments. 6 From a corporate governance perspective, equity-based remuneration has long been considered superior to other forms of remuneration due to its perceived effect of aligning the interests of managers with those of shareholders, thus helping to bridge the gap between principal and agent. However, one of the findings from examining remuneration structures before the financial crisis was that this alignment only takes real effect when grants of stock or stock options are subject to considerable deferral, ideally with employees precluded from hedging or other measures that aim to mitigate the risk associated with their holdings. many international and national guidelines now recommend for variable remuneration, or at least a large portion thereof, to be deferred. 8 More recently, the previously undisputed notion of the overall advantageousness of equity-based remuneration has been called into question in the context of financial firms. The most recent financial crisis has shown that shareholders' interests can diverge significantly from those of creditors, such as bondholders and depositors, let alone those of taxpayers, who were called upon repeatedly to bail-out institutions deemed to be too big to fail. As Bebchuk & Spamann show in a series of stylised examples, shareholders will often be willing for their bank to take on more risk than is socially desirable, especially when the bank is already in turmoil, i.e., when equity is decreasing at a high pace. Once the shareholders are faced with losing their capital contributions, they can only benefit from risky projects as they will rake in the upside. Meanwhile, the downside risk of such projects will largely be borne by creditors, or, in the event of a bail-out, the taxpayers. have at their core a better alignment of interests of employees with those of bondholders. These proposals also add to the broader discussion on 'inside debt', 12 a term that is commonly understood to encompass all financial obligations of a corporation towards its staff, including pension and deferred remuneration claims employees hold against the firm, as opposed to debt held by other creditors. Whereas equity incentives are to induce employees to avoid bankruptcy, inside debt additionally provides employees with an incentive to maintain a high recovery value in bankruptcy for they will only then be able to recover a part of their claim against their employer.
13 This does of course not apply to contingent capital securities that will be written off when the capital ratio drops below a pre-specified threshold, which may happen well before bankruptcy.
However, some commentators put forward some valid concerns regarding the introduction of new remuneration incentives, especially when forced upon banks by the regulators, 14 and also warn against an overreliance on debt-based remuneration. They contend that new incentive instruments will only add further layers of complexity to remuneration systems, thereby increasing the likelihood that bank employees will be unable to discern what behaviour is expected of them. 15 Furthermore, the main beneficiaries of bail-outs during the financial crisis were not the shareholders but the bondholders. Therefore, forfeiture in the event of capital ratio dropping below specified threshold); Tung, n 10, 1229ff (publicly traded subordinated debt securities the reasonable expectation that they will be bailed out along with other holders of corporate debt may cancel out any positive impact inside debt is deemed to have upon the behaviour of employees. 16 As long as equity-based instruments remain part of the remuneration package, employees might also be inclined to make up for potential losses suffered on the debt-based portion of remuneration by assuming additional risk that can increase the value of their equity-based portion. 17 Lastly, it is evident from the financial crisis that the overall interest of social welfare also requires inter-bank lending to continue in times of financial turmoil. Executives that are too risk-averse due to the incentives set through debt-based remuneration might exacerbate an imminent crisis. further improving incentive structures, Kaal recommends the use of high trigger contingent convertible bonds, i.e., bonds that convert to equity once the bank's capital ratio drops below a pre-specified threshold set above the threshold used for contingent convertible bonds issued to external investors.
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Referring to UBS AG's remuneration scheme as a particularly laudable example, some senior economists strongly advocate holdback, or deferral, of a cashbased portion of remuneration that is to be forfeited in the event of the firm becoming distressed. 23 In terms of incentives, this proposition is somewhat reminiscent of awarding write-down bonds to employees in the sense that holders of write-down bonds are similarly exposed to losing their investment in the firm's financial downturn. Financial institutions can implement the economists' proposal by exposing cash-based awards to a special malus provision during a pre-defined deferral period, i.e., the time before payouts to employees occur. Typically, malus, and thus forfeiture of awards, would be made contingent upon the occurrence of a pre-specified event. Where such event is defined exclusively in relation to the capital ratio, or where express reference is made to the performance of a contingent capital instrument, the incentives for the individual employee are broadly identical to awarding him or her with actual contingent capital securities. After all, employees are unlikely to care whether they lose remuneration due to a write-down trigger in a bond or a malus clause in an employment contract or other kind of agreement. Therefore, having cash-based remuneration schemes replicate contingent capital instruments on a purely contractual basis, i.e., synthetically, may be a valid alternative to handing out contingent capital securities to employees.
However, it has to be noted that contingent capital securities and, to a somewhat lesser extent perhaps, contractual replications of contingent capital securities, pose an array of issues, which have frequently been discussed in economic literature 24 and may also take into question their usability for purposes of remuneration. Some scholars even question the viability of the con-cept of such hybrid capital as a whole, advocating significantly tougher equity requirements instead. 25 Up to now, proposals for the inclusion of contingent capital securities in remuneration structures have found little resonance both within the global academic debate and the global standards on remuneration. 26 Neither the FSF Principles for Sound Compensation Practices nor the accompanying Implementation Standards address the use of debt-based securities for purposes of remuneration. They do, however, encourage a broad use of malus and clawback arrangements, 27 which, as discussed above, in conjunction with deferral, transforms cash-based remuneration into inside debt.
Bearing in mind the alleged advantages as well as shortcomings of debt-based remuneration, we now turn to analysing the extent to which the notion of 'bonus bonds' has been taken into account in European standards on remuneration. 35 and expanded on issues such as better alignment of risk, performance and remuneration, deferral of bonuses and the appropriate relationship between variable and fixed pay. To accommodate smaller financial institutions, national legislators were instructed to account for differences in terms of size and complexity of the business of regulated financial institutions when implementing CRD III. (ii) where appropriate, other instruments within the meaning of Article 66(1a) (a), that adequately reflect the credit quality of the credit institution as a going concern.'
III. Regulatory Frameworks and Market
37
The requirement that a minimum of 50% of bonuses be paid in non-cash instruments was already contained in FSB Implementation Standards No. 8. 38 However, the novelty here lay in point (ii). This was the first express acknowledgment in EU legislation that contingent capital securities 39 can serve as a means of remuneration. 40 Missing from the Commission'soriginal proposal, the reference to contingent capital securities only found its way into CRD III immediately before parliamentary discussions. The corresponding report by the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs had even proposed prescribing a much wider use of contingent capital securities in remuneration in financial institutions. 41 In retrospect, this seems fairly remarkable, with only one contingent capital bond having been issued on the market at the time. 42 However, the text eventually adopted by Parliament and the Council of the EU was considerably less bold, also lacking the bonus cap proposed in the report. 43 Nevertheless, in a resolution passed on the same day as CRD III, EU Parliament encouraged the use of 'non-cash instruments such as subordinated debt, contingent capital, shares or share-linked instruments' for purposes of variable remuneration 44 as well as 'pension bonuses'. Despite the audacious efforts of the EU legislators, CRD III failed to induce financial institutions to use such securities for purposes of remuneration.
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Instead, bankers' variable remuneration continued to consist of cash, shares, share-linked instruments and equivalent instruments.
Current Regulatory Framework
After a two-year consultation process, the European Commission submitted proposals to the European Parliament regarding a comprehensive overhaul of the CRD framework in summer 2011. The proposals consisted of a directive replacing the original CRD (CRD IV) 47 and a new regulation (Capital Requirements Regulation; CRR). 48 The primary purpose of the proposals was to transpose the Basel III rules into EU law. To achieve a level playing field across member states, prudential rules previously contained in the directive, such as provisions on capital requirements, were henceforth to form part of the directly applicable regulation, whereas 'the access to the activity of the business of credit institutions' 49 as well as supervisory powers of national regulatory authorities and general principles of supervision were to be addressed in the directive. In addition, the new directive was to cover both credit institutions and investment firms. 50 The differences between these two types of financial firms were no longer thought to justify having two separate directives with largely the same content. The provisions on remuneration were thus due for yet another revision, less than one year after the entry into force of CRD III. The Commission's proposal for CRD IV was based on, and largely adhered to, CRD III as far as the rules on remuneration were concerned. To start with, the definition of the personal scope of application of CRD IV's rules on remuneration was by and large carried over from CRD III. 52 The Commission's proposal for CRD IV also essentially stuck with the provision on the use of contingent capital securities for purposes of remuneration that had been introduced with CRD III. It merely suggested it be moved from the Annex of CRD 53 into the main body of the new directive. 54 However, remuneration 55 once again proved to be a highly contentious topic and was therefore, among a few other issues, the subject of a special trilogue between the three EU legislative bodies. 56 As a result of this process, EU legislators 57 eventually came up with a compromise. As far as the topic at hand was concerned, 58 the compromise text survived the legislative procedure virtually unchanged and was eventually adopted as article 94 (1)(l) written down, that in each case adequately reflect the credit quality of the institution as a going concern and are appropriate to be used for the purposes of variable remuneration.' (emphasis added).
To alleviate the uncertainty and set out what makes an instrument 'appropriate to be used for the purposes of variable remuneration', the European Banking Authority (EBA) was given the task of drafting regulatory technical standards. 60 This draft was published in February 2014 61 and was subsequently adopted by the Commission without further changes by way of a delegated regulation (Regulation on Classes of Instruments). 62 The Regulation on Classes of Instruments is directly applicable in member states and came into effect on 9 June 2014.
Debt-Based Instruments Suitable for Variable Remuneration a) Main Features of the Regulatory Technical Standards
The Regulation on Classes of Instruments sets out in more detail the requirements which debt-based instruments need to meet to be considered appropriate for remuneration purposes. Under the Regulation on Classes of Instruments, instruments awarded by way of variable remuneration must convert to equity instruments or be written down when the Common Equity Tier 1 (CET 1) 63 capital ratio drops below a pre-specified threshold of at least 7%. Remuneration paid in instruments with a lower trigger does not count towards the 50% portion of overall variable remuneration to be made up of instruments. 64 The trigger level of 7% uniformly applies to own funds instruments and 'other instruments', 65 CRD IV 68 requires that own funds instruments used for remuneration purposes reflect the credit quality of the institution as a going concern. The EBA takes the view that this qualification would not be met by regular own funds instruments with a trigger of 5.125%. Secondly, a higher trigger level is thought to provide a more effective incentive for employees to take risks prudently. 69 The Regulation on Classes of Instruments further requires that instruments used for purposes of remuneration comply with the arm's length-principle in terms of valuation and interest rate 70 and feature adequate deferral and retention periods. 71 They also provide additional guidance regarding conversion/ write-down mechanisms by borrowing from the relevant provision in the Regulatory Technical Standards on own funds, 72 according to which it is for the management body of the institution to determine that a trigger event has occurred and to convert or write down the instrument. The Regulation on Classes of Instruments expands thereon where the specific nature of instruments used for remuneration so requires, e.g., with respect to the notification of staff. 73 In line with the respective provisions in the CRR and the Regulatory Technical Standards on own funds, 74 the Regulation on Classes of Instruments also sets out the conditions for a write-up.
b) 'Other Instruments' in Particular
Well before the enactment of CRD IV, there had been at least one cash-based scheme that provided for write-down on a contractual basis rather than involving payment in contingent capital securities. 75 As set out above, such 
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'Bonus Bonds' for Bankersinstruments can provide their holder with incentives similar if not identical to contingent capital securities, depending on the contractual provisions governing the payments made thereunder. Yet, lacking recognition as own funds instruments under CRD III, they did not count towards the 50% portion of variable remuneration to be paid in instruments. 76 New capital requirements introduced in the CRR 77 did not resolve the issue. The relevant provisions can hardly be construed in a way that would allow classification of debt arising from synthetic instruments as regulatory own funds, perhaps unlike other legislation implementing the Basel III Accord.
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To facilitate a broader use of synthetic 'bonus bonds', EU legislators therefore included 'other instruments which can be fully converted to Common Equity Tier 1 instruments or written down' (Other Instruments) 79 in the classes of appropriate instruments. According to the Regulation on Classes of Instruments, Other Instruments are either debt instruments that neither qualify as AT 1 nor as Tier 2 regulatory own funds, but are subject to comparable conversion or write-down mechanisms, or synthetic instruments that are linked to AT 1 or Tier 2 instruments. 80 Therefore, Other Instruments can also be based on a contract between the institution and staff instead of being issued in the market. This not only eliminates the requirement for a prospectus under the EU prospectus directive, but also enables the banks to add specific provisions specifically applicable to employees, such as clauses on retention and deferral, providing a much greater degree of flexibility. Such employee-related clauses would run counter to the principle of equal treatment of investors laid down in the EU prospectus directive were they to be incorporated in the terms and conditions of a capital instrument issued in the market. 81 As for the necessary link to an own funds instrument, this requires that the synthetic instrument must not at any time exceed the reference instrument in terms of value and payouts. In other words, the reference instrument provides a ceiling to payouts to be made under the synthetic instrument. The reference instrument must either be issued through an entity included within the group consolidation under CRR 82 or, in the case of an EU-based subsidiary to a parent under- 
Conclusion with Regard to EU Legislation
At first glance, it would seem that European legislators wanted to encourage banks to increasingly use debt-based instruments over other forms of remuneration. As discussed above, a growing body of research suggests that there might be valid reasons to do so. 84 However, a more in-depth evaluation reveals that CRD IV and, to an even larger extent, the accompanying regulatory technical standards somewhat inhibit the use of debt-based instruments for purposes of remuneration.
Next we shall examine how, and the extent to which, the British and German legislators have implemented the relevant EU provisions as well as the effect this legislation has already had in the respective banking sectors, if any.
B. Implementation of CRD IV and Remuneration Practice
in the United Kingdom
Implementation of CRD IV
The United Kingdom was the only EU member state that did not support the text of CRD IV on its adoption in the Council of the EU. 85 Being home to Europe's largest financial hub, the United Kingdom feared that tough rules on bonuses would undermine the competitiveness of its banking sector, in particular in overseas markets, where not all competitors are subject to comparable restraints. Consequently, in autumn 2013, the United Kingdom lodged a challenge with the European Court of Justice on CRD IV, inter alia, on the grounds that the rules on the bonus cap lacked a sufficient Treaty base. 86 Obligations under EU law forced the United Kingdom to implement CRD IV's rules on bonuses by 1 January 2014, irrespective of the fate of the challenge. Exercising the rule-making powers granted under the amended Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, 88 the UK regulators Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 89 implemented the relevant provisions by amending the Remuneration Code, 90 which is contained in both regulators' handbooks. 91 Regarding the use of debt-based instruments as variable remuneration, the UK regulators 92 did not go into further detail. This is hardly surprising, given the degree of detail already provided in the relevant CRD IV provision, let alone the accompanying regulatory technical standards. However, citing proportionality considerations, FSA guidance that was issued upon the implementation of CRD III in 2011 limited the scope of the rule by exempting staff otherwise subject to the Remuneration Code who were awarded no more than £500,000 in total remuneration, out of which no more than 33% constituted variable remuneration. 93 Furthermore, small 94 banks and investment firms were also excluded from the 95 These exemptions have been carried over into the current regulatory framework and remain applicable. 96 This is of course not to say that exempted staff are barred from participating in incentive schemes involving debt-based instruments. Equally, exempted institutions are free to use debt-based instruments for purposes of remuneration on a voluntary basis.
The UK regulators are currently taking further steps that will help align interests of managers with those of creditors. Such steps involve extending minimum deferral periods during which variable remuneration is subject to malus, as well as requiring regulated firms to amend employment contracts with material risk takers to allow recovery of vested bonuses (clawback). 97 
Practice
Faced with the new EU rules on variable remuneration, various UK banks publicly announced in spring 2014 that they were intent on circumventing the bonus cap by introducing a new class of pay, commonly referred to as 'allowances' 98 Combined with raising the ratio between variable and fixed remuneration from 1:1 to 2:1, 99 UK banks were hopeful that this new class of pay was going to help them retain and attract talent, especially in non-EU markets. However, following a probe into these allowances, the EBA found in October 2014 that in many cases these allowances represented variable rather than fixed remuneration. The EBA therefore advised that banks using such allowances are expected to change their remuneration policies before the end of 2014.
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As of autumn 2013, UK financial institutions had issued the largest share in the global market in contingent capital securities. 101 Yet, only Barclays, Lloyds Banking Group and a couple of building societies such as Nationwide 102 had contributed to the total amount of $20.7 billion that were outstanding in such instruments in the UK as of September 2013. 103 While these institutions have yet to include contingent capital securities in remuneration packages, in 2011 Barclays introduced the so-called Contingent Capital Plan, 104 which was to govern awards of deferred cash bonuses to staff subject to the deferral requirements imposed by the Remuneration Code. 105 Although the scope of the Contingent Capital Plan was not limited to 2011, 106 Barclays did not make any further awards thereunder in subsequent years.
In accordance with the Remuneration Code, cash-based awards under the Contingent Capital Plan made up 50% of all deferred variable remuneration in 2011, with the residual 50% being granted in shares or share-based instruments. 107 Payments were made over a three-year schedule, with awards vesting in three annual tranches. Vesting of these tranches would have been suspended if the group core tier 1 capital ratio had fallen below 7% as of the vesting date. Had the capital ratio failed to recover within five years of the suspension, the awards would have been considered forfeited. 108 The Contingent Capital Plan also provided for payment of a 'discretionary benefit' equivalent to a coupon upon vesting of an award, which was set at 7% for all vesting periods up to 2014.
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In essence, the Contingent Capital Plan merely exposed deferred cash awards to a new kind of malus provision in exchange for a rather substantial coupon. As indicated above, it was motivated by regulations that required for deferral of variable pay. Since abandoning the Contingent Capital Plan in 2012, i.e., merely one year after its inception, Barclays has been granting deferred cash incentives to staff under the terms of the so-called Cash Value Plan, which had already been introduced alongside the Contingent Capital Plan in 2011. 110 The Cash Value Plan ties deferred cash awards to a given number of notional securities, being either shares or other capital instruments, both in terms of value and additional payments. Unlike the Contingent Capital Plan, the Cash Value Plan could therefore meet the standard laid down in the Regulation on Classes of Instruments on synthetic plans 111 if awards were to reference one of Barclays' outstanding own funds instruments, provided that such reference instrument was subject to a trigger of at least 7%. Barclays' Share Value Plan would even allow paying employees in capital instruments. 112 However, to date, Barclays has neither used regulatory own funds instruments as reference instruments, nor has it made awards in contingent capital securities. As of 2014, the firm's capital ratio continues to be one in an array of measures used to determine awards and to subsequently adjust unvested awards by way of malus, 113 albeit in much less obvious fashion than with the Contingent Capital Plan.
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Nationwide uses a malus provision whereby outstanding deferred cash awards under Nationwide's medium term bonus scheme are to be cancelled if the CET 1 capital ratio falls below 10%. 115 Lloyds Banking Group apparently reserves the right to pay a part of deferred annual bonuses to its directors in contingent capital securities.
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Although it has yet to issue proper contingent capital securities in the market, RBS was the first to use junior debt-based instruments for purposes of remuneration, announcing as early as February 2009 that, in lieu of discretionary cash bonuses, it would pay deferred bonuses in subordinated loans.
117 However, in the following year RBS returned to using cash and equity for its bonus awards to its directors. 118 In retrospect, it therefore seems more likely that immense pressure from the public and the UK government to curb remuneration was the crucial factor in leading majority state-owned RBS to pay bonuses in subordinated debt rather than the alleged benefits of debt-based remuneration in terms of aligning bankers with interests of creditors. C. Implementation of CRD IV and Remuneration Practice in Germany
Implementation of CRD IV
In August 2013, German Parliament passed the CRD IV Implementation Act, 120 whereby the Banking Act 121 and other legislation were amended. Some parts of the CRD IV provisions on remuneration, such as the cap on bonuses, were incorporated in § 25a(5) of the Banking Act, while other, more technical issues, such as the requirement that half of variable remuneration be paid in instruments, were to be implemented in an ordinance by the Federal Ministry of Finance. To this end, the Federal Ministry of Finance amended the Remuneration Ordinance for Institutions (German Remuneration Ordinance), 122 which had originally been introduced to implement CRD III.
For reasons of proportionality, the German Remuneration Ordinance divides institutions into two categories. A number of provisions, including the one 123 implementing the requirement for 50% of variable remuneration to be paid in instruments, only apply to 'significant' institutions. 124 Their scope is thus limited to roughly the fifty largest banks in Germany. 125 Unlike CRD IV or the relevant provision of the UK Remuneration Code, the German Remuneration Ordinance does not name the instruments considered suitable for remuneration. Instead, it rather opaquely requires that at least 50% of variable remuneration be contingent upon the sustained welfare of the institution. 126 Additional guidance on this provision published by the German regulator Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) advises institutions to primarily use shares or share-like instruments to satisfy the standard set by the Ordinance, adding in passing that debt instruments subject to write-down or conversion should be used where possible. 127 The German approach to implementing article 94(1)(l) of CRD IV seems rather casual, making no mention of the balance of shares and contingent capital securities in variable remuneration packages required thereunder, 128 and therefore possibly falls short of the standard of implementation under EU law. However, this may be due to the fact that German banks have only begun to issue contingent capital securities after the relevant legislation was enacted. References to contingent capital securities in the context of remuneration may have appeared somewhat premature at the time the German Remuneration Ordinance was drawn up. While the flexibility German legislation seems to afford to institutions in designing remuneration structures should be welcomed, it has to be noted that it is by and large derogated by the directly applicable and exceedingly detailed Regulation on Classes of Instruments. 129 
Practice
As noted above, German banks have only begun to issue contingent capital securities very recently. Their hesitance was largely caused by apprehension towards possible tax implications. More specifically, there had been doubt as to whether interest payments made under contingent capital instruments would be deductible under German tax law. After the German Ministry of Finance confirmed the tax-deductibility in April 2014, Deutsche Bank went ahead and issued its first contingent capital instruments. 130 Although initially eager to follow suit, 131 other banks seem to have shelved their plans to issue contingent capital securities for the time being.
Considering the above, it is not surprising that incentive structures at large German banks have so far exclusively revolved around more traditional means of remuneration, i.e., cash, equity or equity-linked cash awards. 132 While Deutsche Bank continues to use equity-based instruments to satisfy the minimum of 50% of variable remuneration that must be paid in instruments, it broke new ground in 2014 by introducing a firm-wide malus provision involving the firm's capital ratio. Should the CET 1 capital ratio at any time drop below a threshold consisting of the applicable regulatory minimum requirement plus an additional 200 basis points, all equity-based awards unvested at that time will be forfeited. 133 Unlike other malus or clawback provisions, this not only applies to staff subject to the Remuneration Ordinance for Institutions, but also to non-regulated employees. Additionally, the CET 1 capital ratio is a measure for the calculation of the initial awards. 134 The German banking sector traditionally features many state banks and cooperative banks. As a rule, variable remuneration is less common and generally makes up a smaller share of total remuneration in German cooperative and state banks. Unable to link remuneration to equity instruments, state banks tend to pay variable remuneration in cash, subject partially to deferral and adjustment provisions to factor in sustained changes in value in order to live up to the standard laid down in the German Remuneration Ordinance. , but also by passing new legislation.
138 Not being a member state of the EU, Switzerland has been trying to pursue a fairly independent regulatory approach, whilst still keeping abreast of, and taking part in, international regulatory activities. Faced with banking behemoths like UBS AG and Credit Suisse Group AG, whose combined assets in 2011 amounted to roughly four times the Swiss GDP, 139 tackling the apparent 'too big to fail'-problem associated with its two big banks was obviously a top priority for Swiss lawmakers and regulators. One key measure to enhance financial stability was the prescription of increased capital requirements for all Swiss banks with additional requirements for systemic important financial institutions (SIFIs). 140 These new capital requirements, strengthened in terms of quantity and quality (loss-absorbency), even exceed the requirements laid down in the Basel III Accord and must be implemented gradually by 2019. 141 In the discussions on the optimal regulatory capital mix, the Swiss Federal Council proposed, inter alia, the creation of a legal foundation for contingent capital securities, 142 which were deemed capable of strengthening banks' capital bases due to their loss-absorbing characteristics. 143 In contrast to the Basel III Accord, Swiss law explicitly recognises contingent capital securities as an independent category of regulatory capital. 144 It allows banks, and SIFIs in particular, to satisfy part of their increased capital requirements with such instruments, namely up to 3% for the capital buffer and a significant part of their progressive component. 145 Regulatory recognition is, however, subject to certain eligibility criteria. For a contingent capital instrument to be recognised as AT 1 capital, the terms of such instrument must provide for two kinds of triggers causing either conversion or write-down: (a) a trigger based on the CET 1 capital ratio 146 and (b) a so-called legal trigger. The latter is to secure that a conversion or write-down occur whenever the financial institution has reached a so-called 'point of non-viability' (PONV), i.e., when either (i) a drawdown of emergency financial aid from public authorities is imminent, or (ii) the Swiss Financial Supervisory Authority (FINMA) determines that a conversion or write-down is necessary to avoid the bank's insolvency or bankruptcy. 147 By contrast, Tier 2 capital instruments only need to be subject to conversion or write-down upon a PONV-event, while triggers based on capital ratios are optional. 148 fully issuing contingent capital securities with a conversion mechanism to external investors. Further issuances by different Swiss issuers followed.
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The subsequent eligibility of contingent capital securities as regulatory capital only added further to the popularity of these instruments.
Debate on Remuneration and Current Regulatory Framework
In light of the described Swiss regulatory approach, remunerating bank executives with contingent capital securities seems appealing for financial institutions, not only to improve incentive structures for their executives, but also to meet the imposed increased capital requirements. So far, however, the current debate on remuneration in Switzerland has not yet focused on this new means of remuneration. Academic discussion has only recently begun to analyse this idea. Although the financial crisis intensified the debate in Switzerland on management remuneration, the political discussions primarily concentrated on the limitation of excessive management remuneration rather than on the actual design of remuneration schemes. One prominent offspring of these discussions was the successful federal popular initiative against rip-off salaries of 2013 (the Minder Initiative 151 ), seeking to control executive pay of listed companies and to increase shareholders' say in corporate governance.
152 However, the constitutional amendment brought about through the adoption of the Minder Initiative does not address the design of remuneration schemes and nor does the federal legislation enacted as a result of the adoption do so either. 153 Other popular initiatives that were arguably more radical (in particular on determining a hard cap on management remuneration) did not find support in the Swiss population. No. 7 of these Principles requires financial institutions to defer payment of part of the remuneration 156 in such a way that it optimally promotes the risk awareness of the beneficiaries and encourages them to operate the business in a sustainable manner. 157 Akin to the international standards briefly discussed above, the FINMA-Circular provides only vague guidelines as to the recommended deferral time period.
158 It should be pointed out in this context that the functioning of the incentive structure envisaged by remunerating bank executives in contingent capital securities is always going to be very much dependent on an appropriate deferral period. For regulatory reasons in connection with the recognition of these capital instruments, it might additionally be necessary to coordinate deferral time periods with required minimum terms. 159 Similarly opaque are FINMA's directions on the proportion of variable remuneration to total remuneration and the relationship between immediate and deferred remuneration. 160 The said FINMA-Circular is, however, silent on the forms of financial instruments to be used in remuneration schemes of financial institutions, neither encouraging nor prohibiting debtbased remuneration schemes. It needs to be added, though, that the increased complexity associated with debt-based remuneration schemes is only recon- to which the remuneration scheme should be simple and comprehensible for current and potential beneficiaries. In conclusion, the current regulatory framework in Switzerland seems to be at least neutral towards the use of contingent capital securities in remuneration schemes of financial institutions, even supporting their implementation due to their regulatory treatment.
Treatment of Debt-based Remuneration Schemes in Terms of Capital Adequacy
Pursuant to the Basel III Accord, an inclusion of capital instruments in Tier 1 or Tier 2 regulatory capital components requires, inter alia, that such capital instruments be 'issued and paid-in'. Unlike the relevant CRR provisions, 161 article 20(1) of the Capital Adequacy Ordinance does not strictly adhere to the Basel III Accord, but takes a more liberal approach by requiring own funds instruments to be 'either fully paid-in or internally generated'. The rationale behind the insertion of the words 'internally generated' is not entirely clear. In any event, they give rise to the question whether debt obligations under synthetic remuneration schemes 162 may qualify as regulatory capital if they are subject to appropriate write-down or conversion 163 mechanisms.
164
Under a literal interpretation of the term, deferred awards under a synthetic remuneration scheme would arguably qualify as 'internally generated' to the extent they have been expensed 165 prior to the vesting date of the respective award, reducing the profit available for distribution in a manner similar to provisions for future liabilities. 166 By repeatedly referring to the narrower term 'conversion capital' 167 in lieu of the broader term 'capital instrument', the pertinent provisions in the Capital Adequacy Ordinance on capital requirements for SIFIs would rather suggest a strict interpretation, prohibiting an extension on synthetic remuneration schemes. This understanding would also be in line with the narrow language used in the Basel III Accord. Adopting a more functional approach, it could be argued that synthetic remuneration schemes incorporating write-down or conversion mechanisms generally have loss-absorbency capabilities comparable to issued capital instruments and should therefore be treated equally. Their loss-absorbency capabilities could, however, be drawn into question by the fact that awards to different employees under a synthetic remuneration scheme are typically not governed exclusively by one single document of terms and conditions. It is therefore quite conceivable that, in addition to the terms of the scheme and the agreement under which the award was granted, there exist further agreements between the financial institution and an employee participating in the scheme that could come to have a bearing on the outcome of a court case. Furthermore, it cannot be ruled out that local labour laws in the countries in which beneficiaries to the plan reside 168 may void contractual malus or clawback mechanisms that are based on the financial institution's capital ratio if, e.g., such mechanisms are considered to constitute an unlawful transfer of the business risk from employer to employee.
The annual reports of 2013 und 2014 from Switzerland's largest banks, however, clearly indicate that FINMA seems to recognise synthetic remuneration schemes as own funds instruments 169 and consider remuneration liabilities eligible for recognition as AT 1 or Tier 2 capital, as the case may be, provided that they contribute to loss-absorbency upon the occurrence of a trigger event. 170 Such recognition is in any event contingent upon prior FINMA approval, allowing FINMA to check whether all requirements set out in the Capital Adequacy Ordinance for recognition as AT 1 and Tier 2 capital, respectively, are met. 171 As far as Tier 2 capital is concerned, an up-front expenditure of the entire remuneration amount is required. Partial expenditures, e.g., conducted on an annual basis, are not permissible since each partial expenditure would per se not meet the requirement of the five year minimum term. 172 A legal amortisation obligation requires that the eligible amount of Tier 2 instruments be reduced by 20% each year in the last five years of their term. 173 Absent a trigger event and after expiration of the minimum term, payouts to employees may, in contrast to AT 1 instruments, not be refused on the grounds of an inappropriate capital base. 174 This is a significant advantage of Tier 2 instruments.
When it comes to AT 1 capital, the requirement for perpetual duration 175 may confront financial institutions with further difficulties in designing synthetic remuneration schemes for the purposes of generating regulatory capital: as financial institutions are not obliged by law to repay the principal of perpetual AT 1 capital instruments prior to entering into liquidation, beneficiaries of remuneration schemes designed for recognition as AT 1 capital would de facto be doomed to remain invested in the instrument forever, unable to monetise their claims by offloading them in the market. 176 From an incentive point of view, this hardly seems to be an attractive proposition for employees. 177 However, it could be argued that, from an economic perspective, prior cash payouts to beneficiaries generally do not impair the loss-absorbing capabilities of such instruments as long as the total amount of liabilities under the remuneration scheme -the total 'notional principal' if considered as a pool of several 'notional bonds' -remains unaffected over time. This could be reached either (i) by transferring 'notional bonds' from the recipient of a cash payment at vesting to another beneficiary, or (ii) by replacing existing 'notional bonds' with new ones ahead of payouts, i.e., by awarding additional 'notional bonds' to the same beneficiary before the original ones vest. 178 According to this line of argument, a financial institution would be allowed to make payouts to beneficiaries of the remuneration scheme at the vesting date of their interests, provided the overall 'rolling pool of notional bonds' has been sufficiently replenished. In line with the above, such pool of 'notional bonds' will in any event only be recognised as AT 1 capital up to a certain level to control for payouts to beneficiaries. In contrast to Tier 2 instruments, there will always be uncertainty for the remuneration scheme beneficiaries whether payouts would be refused by FINMA referring to an inappropriate capital base. 
Practice
Probably because of the illiquidity of Swiss contingent capital securities markets and the problem related thereto of timely procuring such capital instruments, remuneration schemes involving actually issued contingent capital securities have not been in use in Switzerland until now. However, both major Swiss banks, UBS AG and Credit Suisse Group AG, currently maintain synthetic remuneration schemes with write-down mechanisms under which bank managers are paid in 'notional bonds'.
The mandatory Deferred Contingent Capital Plan (DCCP) of UBS AG was initially (in 2012-2013) set up as a Tier 2 capital instrument. In the beginning of 2015, UBS AG announced 180 the plan's redesign into a Tier 1 capital instrument and declared that it would continue running it as a AT 1 instrument as of the end of 2014. Under the current plan, employees whose total remuneration is in excess of USD/CHF 300,000 181 are annually awarded part of their remuneration 182 in the form of interest-bearing 183 'notional additional Tier 1 (AT1)
instruments' (notional bonds), which can, at the discretion of UBS, be settled either in the form of a cash payment or a perpetual, marketable AT 1 instrument. 184 This current design contrasts the ancient Deferred Contingent Capital Plan, under which the awards granted qualified as Tier 2 capital, requiring the instruments to have a minimum duration of five years and to be fully expensed up-front. 185 Under both plans, awards granted are forfeited if the CET 1 capital ratio falls below 10% for members of the group executive board and 7% for all other bank employees respectively. In addition, awards are forfeited if a PONV-event occurs, i.e., (i) if a write-down will be prescribed by FINMA to prevent the bank's insolvency or bankruptcy, or (ii) if UBS AG receives a commitment of extraordinary support from the public sector. Awards vest in full after five years subject to there being no trigger event.
Credit Suisse Group AG, in turn, went from the outset for recognition of their Contingent Capital Awards as AT 1 capital. 186 For 2014, the total Contingent Capital Awards awarded to 5,891 employees had a fair value of CHF 360 million. Contingent Capital Awards are scheduled to vest on the third anniversary of the grant date and will be expensed gradually over the vesting period. As a result of its ongoing grant practice, the volume of the recognised AT 1 capital will steadily increase in an initial work-up phase. For payouts of the initial awards to be permissible at their vesting date (i.e., at the end of 2016 for the awards granted in 2013), recognition of the scheme as AT 1 capital will need to be limited to the combined amount outstanding under the unvested awards (i.e., awards granted in 2014, 2015 and 2016), or, in other words, to what will be left in the 'rolling pool' after the payout has been made. Contingent Capital Awards provide a conditional right to receive semi-annual interest payments 187 and will be written down either (i) if the Credit Suisse Group's reported CET 1 capital ratio falls below 7%, or (ii) if a PONV-event occurs. At settlement, employees will receive, at the discretion of Credit Suisse Group AG, either contingent capital instruments or a cash payment based on the Contingent Capital Awards' fair value. 
IV. Analysis
Inventory -Our observations above show that contingent capital securities have so far remained fairly limited in their practical application for the purpose of remuneration. European financial institutions have, up to now, not been keen on using them for purposes of remuneration. Barclays set a precedent in 2011 by designing a cash-based remuneration plan modelled on contingent capital securities, only to abolish it just one year later. The idea of 'bonus bonds' has had more legs in Switzerland where the two major banks, UBS AG and Credit Suisse Group AG, have recently implemented synthetic remuneration schemes that contractually replicate contingent capital securities. Thanks to a broader definition of regulatory capital in Swiss capital adequacy regulations, the two banks even managed to obtain recognition of their remuneration schemes as regulatory capital.
While the notion of contingent capital has yet to catch on with U.S. legislators and regulators, several incentive plans in place at large U.S. financial institutions involve the Tier 1 capital ratio as a measure for adjusting awards made under these plans. 188 The same applies to financial institutions in other EU jurisdictions.
189 Some of these arrangements have already been in place for multiple years. 190 The adjustments to be carried out under the respective plans are mostly confined to unvested awards (malus) but occasionally also cover vested awards (clawback). A closer look reveals that the remuneration schemes of Barclays, UBS AG and Credit Suisse Group AG, that have at times been referred to as 'bonus bonds', also operate by imposing such malus provisions on what are essentially deferred cash awards.
Appraisal -We do not think there is anything wrong with this preference of banks for synthetic remuneration schemes. There being no efficient secondary market as yet for contingent capital securities awarded as remuneration and with awards presumably continuing to be subject to vesting or otherwise restricting provisions, employees are unlikely to have a strong preference for either awarded contingent capital securities or deferred cash bonuses when either will lose their value in the event of a material deterioration of the CET 1 capital ratio.
Furthermore, synthetic schemes afford greater flexibility to institutions, e.g., by enabling them to contractually attach further employee-specific malus provisions that would not be permissible in an issued instrument. They are also easier to implement, especially if the financial institution has yet to issue contingent capital securities. However, this contractual flexibility in designing synthetic remuneration schemes may also have substantial drawbacks when it is abused to the disadvantage, or even detriment, of the employees. They might have been better protected against the bargaining power of their employer if they were remunerated in rigid issued contingent capital securities. Another issue inextricably connected with complex synthetic remuneration schemes is the conflict of interest that the 'designers' of such a scheme will find themselves in when they personally stand to benefit from it.
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Another argument in favour of synthetic remuneration schemes is grounded on the fact that bank employees, and in particular bank executives, form (as recipients of contingent capital instruments) a special group of investors, distinguishing themselves from external investors through their ability to exert influence on the issuer and their privileged access to information by virtue of their functions. 192 In light of this insider knowledge, it is advisable to avoid the existence of tradable claims during the term of the instrument, allowing a dangerous split between economic interest and insider position. Exerting control over such claims seems to be more feasible in a synthetic remuneration scheme than in the event of issued and therefore tradable instruments.
But even where the institution has previously issued contingent capital instruments, trading in these securities may often be rather infrequent due to the still nascent market in these kinds of securities. This market illiquidity may make it difficult, or at least expensive, to timely obtain the securities needed to satisfy claims arising under a remuneration scheme. In conclusion, it is in our view this substitutability that compellingly explains the fairly limited proliferation of contingent capital securities in remuneration schemes of financial institutions.
